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LITIGATING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
Lee Tien*
The state secrets privilege raises important separation of powers and institutional competence questions, especially for courts. Congress can statutorily modify this common-law evidentiary privilege, which should facilitate
judicial management of civil litigation with national security implications.
Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, for example, district courts
are expressly authorized to evaluate the legality of government electronic
surveillance in special proceedings. This article describes some of the practical litigation problems that arise even when Congress authorizes courts to
review claimed national security secrets in the context of a case alleging
that the National Security Agency engaged in unlawful warrantless wire†
tapping.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the constitutional issues raised by the
Executive’s use of the state secrets privilege to frustrate civil litigation over
*

Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation. Thanks to Jon Eisenberg and
Ashlee Albies for their very helpful comments.
†

As this article went to press, Judge Walker granted summary judgment to the Al-Haramain
plaintiffs, finding that the government had violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA). In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., F. Supp. 2d, 2010 WL 1244349
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010). The court was dismissive of the government’s claim of unbridled
Executive power: “Under defendants’ theory, executive branch officials may treat FISA as
optional and freely employ the SSP [state secrets privilege] to evade FISA, a statute enacted
specifically to rein in and create a judicial check for executive branch abuses of surveillance
authority.” Id. at *13. The government had steadfastly refused to engage the Al-Haramain
plaintiffs on the facts, as discussed more fully in this article. Accordingly, the court found
that “defendants could readily have availed themselves of the court’s processes to present a
single, case-dispositive item of evidence at one of a number of stages of this multi-year ligitation: a FISA warrant. They never did so.” Id. at *14. Therefore, “[f]or purposes of this
litigation, there was no such warrant for the electronic surveillance of any of plaintiffs,” and
the surveillance therefore violated FISA. Id. at *15. Aside from finding the government
liable for violating FISA and dismissing all claims against FBI Director Robert Mueller in
his individual capacity, the decision did not resolve any of the Al-Haramain plaintiffs’ other
legal claims. See id. at *21. Judge Walker gave them a choice: voluntarily dismiss their nonFISA claims and obtain a final judgment, including damages, on their FISA claim, or press
their additional claims, in which case the court and the parties would schedule a case management conference to determine further proceedings. Id.
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violations of statutory and constitutional rights.1 However, the epic nature
of the theoretical issues of separation of powers and individual rights in the
national security context should not distract us from the practical impact of
state secrets privilege assertions on litigation even after the case survives
multiple motions to dismiss. How are plaintiffs to litigate cases when courts
fear that the litigation itself may touch upon state secrets that may, if disclosed, harm national security?
The Supreme Court seemed to answer this question in the seminal
state secrets case United States v. Reynolds,2 which concerned a tort action
for wrongful death arising out of a military airplane crash. Although the
Supreme Court found that evidence about electronic devices that were being
tested when the plane crashed and killed the plaintiffs’ spouses was indeed
protected by the state secrets privilege,3 it nevertheless remanded the case to
proceed without the privileged materials.4 The Court noted that because the
surviving crew members were available for examination, “it should be possible for [the plaintiffs] to adduce the essential facts as to causation without
resort to material touching upon military secrets.”5
Reynolds thus expresses confidence that courts and plaintiffs can
manage discovery even when state secrets are involved. Courts nevertheless
continue to be perplexed by the actual management of state secrets cases.
The Executive’s demand that courts “look down the road”—i.e., to evaluate
a case far in advance of the normal procedures for developing an evidentiary record—runs contrary to the iterative fact-development process of
normal litigation and forces courts to play litigation gatekeeper in difficult
circumstances. Even when courts find a reasonable path to navigate, they
face practical difficulties in making the normal adversary process work in
the face of Executive refusal to provide litigants or their counsel with access
to information needed to litigate the case.

1

See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive
Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the
Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007); D. A. Jeremy
Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the Judiciary Can (and Should) Fix the State
Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 499 (2007); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto,
State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 108–32 (2005); Christina E. Wells,
State Secrets & Executive Accountability, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1576578; Laura Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1566982.
2
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
3
Id. at 10–11.
4
Id. at 12.
5
Id. at 11.
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This article tells a cautionary tale of how the Executive refused to
accept judicial authority to manage litigation and to grant some level of
litigant access in the interests of due process and the federal courts’ Article
III power to decide cases. Courts and litigants face significant hurdles in
actual litigation even when Congress has preempted the state secrets privilege so as to avoid threshold dismissal.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND THRESHOLD
DISMISSAL
The state secrets privilege prevents discovery of secret evidence
when disclosure would threaten national security. Reynolds set forth the
basic framework of the privilege: (1) it belongs to the government; (2) it
must be properly invoked by means of a “formal claim of privilege, lodged
by the head of the department which has control over the matter” after “actual personal consideration;”6 (3) the court must then “determine whether
the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect;”7 (4) the precise nature, extent, and manner of this inquiry depends
in part on the extent of a party’s need for the information sought tested
against the strength of the government’s claim of privilege;8 and (5) in camera review can be appropriate, but not in all cases.9
When the privilege applies, “the evidence is unavailable, as though
a witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of the evidence,” and with “no
alteration of pertinent substantive or procedural rules.”10 Two of these consequences are relatively clear. Litigation may proceed so long as (1) the
plaintiffs can still prove “the essential facts” of their claims;11 and (2) invocation of the privilege does not deprive “the defendant of information that
would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense.”12 Otherwise, the case
may be dismissed or summary judgment may be granted for the defendant.13
6

Id. at 8.
Id. (citation omitted).
8
Id. at 11.
9
See id. at 10.
10
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); see id. at 65
(remanding to determine whether plaintiffs could prove prima facie case without privileged
information).
11
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
12
Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bareford v. General
Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992)). A “valid defense” is “meritorious
and not merely plausible and would require judgment for the defendant.” In re Sealed Case,
494 F.3d 139, 149–50 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Were the valid-defense exception expanded to
mandate dismissal of a complaint for any plausible or colorable defense, then virtually every
7
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More controversial is the third possible consequence: if the “very
subject matter of the action is a state secret,” courts often dismiss the plaintiff’s action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets privilege.14 In
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,15 which challenged the Central Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program, the Ninth Circuit held that
this type of threshold dismissal is not available under Reynolds because
“[t]his sweeping characterization of the ‘very subject matter’ bar has no
logical limit” and would “cordon off all secret government actions from
judicial scrutiny.”16 Instead, the proper course is to “excis[e] secret evidence
on an item-by-item basis, rather than foreclos[e] litigation altogether at the
outset.”17 The case is being reheard en banc and under submission as of this
writing.18
III. LITIGATION OVER THE WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
A.

Background

On December 16, 2005, the New York Times reported that in the
years following September 11, 2001, President Bush secretly authorized the
National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct electronic surveillance on
Americans and others without warrants.19 The Government soon publicly
acknowledged that its secret activities had indeed included the warrantless
interception of international communications where one party to the communication was believed to have links to al-Qaeda and related terrorist organizations.20
case in which the United States successfully invokes the state secrets privilege would need to
be dismissed.”).
13
See, e.g., Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting summary judgment where the state secret privilege precluded the government from using a valid defense).
14
Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26).
15
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2009).
16
Id. at 955. Threshold dismissal for lawsuits brought by plaintiffs on the basis of secret
espionage agreements with the Government remains viable under the separate doctrine of
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876). Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 954 (noting that under
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10 (2005), Totten prohibits only suits that would necessarily reveal
“the plaintiff’s [secret] relationship with the Government”).
17
Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 995.
18
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009).
19
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
20
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF. ET AL., UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE
PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 6 (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.justice.
gov/oig/special/s0907.pdf. While the surveillance acknowledged in December 2005 is known
as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” the report of the Inspector General makes clear that
the President also authorized “Other Intelligence Activities.” Id. (citing Letter from Alberto
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On May 11, 2006, USA Today reported the existence of an NSA
program in which some telecommunications carriers were alleged to have
provided telephone calling records of tens of millions of Americans to the
NSA.21 The article alleged that BellSouth Corp., Verizon Communications
Inc., and AT&T gave the government access to a database of domestic
communication records that the NSA uses “to analyze calling patterns in an
effort to detect terrorist activity.”22
In response to these revelations:
[D]ozens of lawsuits by customers of telecommunications companies were
filed alleging various causes of action related to such cooperation with the
NSA in warrantless wiretapping of customers’ communications. . . . The
cases typically alleged federal constitutional and statutory violations as
well as causes of action based on state law such as breach of contract,
breach of warranty, violation of privacy and unfair business practices.23

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered these cases transferred
to the Northern District of California in August 2006 and consolidated before U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker.24
These cases against the telecommunications companies followed a
common pattern.
The United States moved to intervene in the case and simultaneously to
dismiss it, asserting the state secrets privilege (SSP) and arguing, in essence, that the SSP required immediate dismissal because no further
progress in the litigation was possible without compromising national security. The telecommunications company defendants in the case also
moved to dismiss on other grounds.25

Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://ftp.fas.org/irp/news/2007/08/ag080107.pdf)
(“The specific details of the Other Intelligence Activities remain highly classified, although
the Attorney General publicly acknowledged the existence of such activities in August 2007.
Together, the Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Other Intelligence Activities comprise
the PSP.”).
21
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY,
May 11, 2006, at 1A.
22
Id.
23
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955 (N.D. Ca.
2009) (dismissing cases against telecommunications carrier defendants), appeal pending No.
09-16676 (9th Cir.). The basis for the dismissal was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISAAA). See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
24
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 956.
25
Id. at 955–56 (citations omitted).
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In the first of these cases, decided prior to the MDL transfer, the
district court denied the motions to dismiss.26 All of the cases were eventually dismissed, however, based on section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISAAA),27 which
“included an immunity provision for the benefit of telecommunications
companies that would be triggered if and when the Attorney General of the
United States certified certain facts to the relevant United States district
court.”28
B.

The Al-Haramain Case

While most of these cases were brought against the telecommunications companies themselves, some were brought against the Government
and individual government officials.29 The most notable of these cases was
brought by the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation30 and two of its individual
attorneys, Wendell Belew and Asim Ghafoor.31
26

See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1885a); see In re Nat’l
Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 956–60 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing immunity provisions).
28
See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp 2d at 956. FISAAA
was enacted while Hepting was first on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the case
without rendering a decision “in light of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.” Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
29
See, e.g., Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. C 07-1115 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. Feb.
23, 2007); Guzzi v. Bush, No. C 06-6225 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2006), dismissed per
stipulation, Order, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (VRW)
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/california/candce/M:2006cv01791/183077/713/; Shubert v. Bush, No. C 07-0693
(VRW), 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010) (dismissing Shubert); Jewel v. Nat’l
Sec. Agency, No. C 08-4373 (VRW), 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010) (dismissing Jewel). In addition, some cases were brought by the U.S. “seeking to enjoin state officials
in Maine, New Jersey, Connecticut, Vermont and Missouri from investigating various telecommunication carriers concerning their alleged disclosure of customer telephone records”
to the NSA. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 at 1. “These
cases, together with a subpoena enforcement action brought by the same Missouri officials
who are defendants in the United States’ injunction case concerning that state, were transferred to [Judge Walker] by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) on February 15, 2007 . . . .” In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1092,
1093–94 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (footnote omitted) (dismissing cases under Section 803 of
FISAAA, 50 U.S.C. § 1885b). In addition, one case against the government was litigated
separately from the cases in the consolidated MDL, resulting ultimately in a dismissal for
lack of standing. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.
2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1179 (2008).
30
“Al-Haramain is a Muslim charity which is active in more than 50 countries. Its activities include building mosques and maintaining various development and education programs.
The United Nations Security Council has identified Al-Haramain as an entity belonging to or
27

File: Tien (#8).docx

2010]

Created on: 5/11/2010 3:39:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/11/2010 4:12:00 PM

LITIGATING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE

681

The complaint alleged: (1) that the NSA conducted warrantless
electronic surveillance of communications between a director or directors of
Al-Haramain and the two attorney plaintiffs; (2) that the NSA turned over
logs from this surveillance to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC);
and (3) that OFAC then consequently froze Al-Haramain’s assets.32 It alleged “violations of FISA, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”33
Filed under seal with the complaint was a copy of a classified document (the “Sealed Document”) that OFAC had inadvertently disclosed to
counsel for Al-Haramain as part of a production of unclassified documents
relating to Al-Haramain’s potential status as a “specially designated global
terrorist.”34 The Sealed Document apparently provided evidence that the
NSA had, in fact, conducted the alleged electronic surveillance, thus establishing the Al-Haramain plaintiffs’ standing.35
The problem was that the Government, in addition to asserting that
the very subject matter of the case was a state secret, also asserted SSP over

associated with Al Qaeda.” Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th
Cir. 2007).
31
Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 2006), rev’d, 507
F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). The case was later transferred to Judge Walker by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
32
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
33
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 507 F.3d at 1195.
34
The District Court explained:
[The Office of Foreign Assets Control] inadvertently disclosed this document to
counsel for Al-Haramain in late August 2004 as part of a production of unclassified documents relating to Al-Haramain’s potential status as a specially designated
global terrorist. Lynne Bernabei, an attorney for Al-Haramain . . . , copied and disseminated the materials, including the pertinent document which was labeled “TOP
SECRET,” to Al-Haramain’s directors and Bernabei’s co-counsel. In August or
September, a reporter from the Washington Post reviewed these documents for an
article he was researching. . . . At the request of the FBI, Bernabei and her cocounsel returned their copies of the sensitive document to the FBI. The FBI did not
pursue Al-Haramain’s directors, whom the government describes as “likely recipients” of the document, to ask them to return their copies.
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1218–19. See also Ryan Singel, NSA
Snooped on Lawyers Knowing Spying Was Illegal, Suit Charges, WIRED, July 10, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/07/haramain_appeal.
35
According to plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Sealed Document “establishes that the government had intercepted attorney-client telephone conversations . . . . between an Al-Haramain
director in Saudi Arabia and two of the charity’s attorneys in Washington, D.C.” Thomas H.
Nelson & Mark J. Fucile, When the Government Is Listening in: Advising Clients Under
Surveillance, OR. ST. B. BULL., at 33 (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.osbar.org/
publications/bulletin/08apr/g-men.html.
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the Sealed Document.36 Recall that the SSP has been found by lower courts
to justify threshold dismissal of a case in three circumstances: (1) when the
“very subject matter” of the case is itself a state secret; (2) when SSP prevents plaintiffs from making a prima facie case; or (3) when SSP prevents
defendants from asserting a valid defense.37 Thus, if the Sealed Document,
which appeared essential to plaintiffs’ Article III standing, and thus to their
prima facie case, were protected by SSP, Al-Haramain’s claims would still
be subject to threshold dismissal.
Al-Haramain countered that Congress had preempted the state secrets privilege, since “FISA vests the courts with control over materials
relating to electronic surveillance, subject to ‘appropriate security procedures and protective orders’ . . . . [This control] renders the state secrets
privilege superfluous in FISA litigation.”38
While skeptical of the Government’s position, the Oregon district
court declined to decide the FISA preemption issue39 but found that the very
subject matter of the case was not a state secret and denied the Executive’s
motion to dismiss, holding that “plaintiffs should have an opportunity to
establish standing and make a prima facie case, even if they must do so in
camera.”40 The Government had, in fact, conceded that “Plaintiffs remain
free to make any allegations and assert any arguments in support of their
standing, or any other argument, as they deem appropriate, and the Court
has the power to review the sealed classified document in order to assess
Plaintiffs’ claims and arguments.”41
On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the very subject matter of the case was not a state secret because of the extensive public
knowledge about the NSA surveillance program42 and affirmed the district
36

See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
See supra text accompanying notes 11, 12, 14.
38
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f)
(2006)).
39
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (“I decline to reach this very
difficult question at this time, which involves whether Congress preempted what the government asserts is a constitutionally-based privilege,” but noting that “[t]o accept the government’s argument that Section 1806(f) is only applicable when the government intends to
use information against a party would nullify FISA’s private remedy and would be contrary
to the plain language of Section 1806(f).”).
40
Id. at 1226 (describing procedure by which plaintiffs could submit sealed affidavits
attesting to the contents of the document from their memories).
41
Id. at 1226–27 (citation omitted).
42
Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing
how “the American public” has “a wealth of information” about the surveillance program).
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the very subject matter of the litigation—the government’s alleged warrantless surveillance program under the
TSP—is not protected by the state secrets privilege. Two discrete sets of unclassi37
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court’s denial of dismissal on that basis.43 However, the Ninth Circuit also
found after in camera review that the Sealed Document was protected by
the state secrets privilege and rejected the Oregon district court’s “compromise solution.”44
Without the Sealed Document, the Ninth Circuit held that “AlHaramain cannot establish that it has standing, and its claims must be dismissed, unless FISA preempts the state secrets privilege.”45 The court declined to decide the preemption question and instead remanded the case to
the district court to consider that question “and for any proceedings collateral to that determination.”46
IV. PREEMPTION AND ITS INTERACTION WITH SSP
This article has thus far discussed the SSP’s operation as an extraordinary common-law evidentiary privilege that can justify threshold
dismissal. Congress, however, “retains the ultimate authority to modify or
set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not
required by the Constitution”47 and “has plenary authority over the promul-

fied facts support this determination. First, President Bush and others in the administration publicly acknowledged that in the months following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, the President authorized a communications surveillance
program that intercepted the communications of persons with suspected links to Al
Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. Second, in 2004, Al-Haramain was officially declared by the government to be a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist”
due to its purported ties to Al Qaeda. The subject matter of the litigation—the TSP
and the government’s warrantless surveillance of persons or entities who, like AlHaramain, were suspected by the NSA to have connections to terrorists—is simply
not a state secret.
Id. at 1197–98.
43
Id. at 1201.
44
Id. at 1203–04; id. at 1204–05 (“The Sealed Document, its contents, and any individuals’ memories of its contents, even well-reasoned speculation as to its contents, are completely barred from further disclosure in this litigation by the common law state secrets privilege.”).
45
Id. at 1205.
46
Id. at 1206.
47
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
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gation of evidentiary rules for the federal courts.”48 It follows that Congress
can “preempt” or modify the operation of the SSP by statute.49
An early case found that Congress had done so in the Invention
Secrecy Act of 1951.50 That Act required nondisclosure of otherwise patentable inventions when their disclosure could compromise national security,
but because nondisclosure precludes the inventor from receiving or exploiting the patent, it also provided for compensation for inventors through the
filing of an administrative claim.51 After being denied compensation,52 the
plaintiff brought suit in district court. The government argued that the Act
conferred no right to bring suit during the pendency of the secrecy order.53
In the alternative, it argued that its assertion of the state secrets privilege
compelled dismissal of the claim.54
The court held that the plain language of the statute permitted a
claim contesting the administrative finding even while the secrecy order
was pending.55 The court’s key point was that when Congress creates private rights of action, it subordinates SSP to the requirements of litigation.
The court reasoned:
Congress has created rights which it has authorized federal courts to try.
Inevitably, by their very nature, the trial of cases involving patent application placed under a secrecy order will always involve matters within the
scope of this privilege. Unless Congress has created rights which are completely illusory, existing only at the mercy of government officials, the act
must be viewed as waiving the privilege.56

48
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976); see also Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). Congress’s
power is limited in one important way: “Although evidentiary matters are governed by the
rules, they cannot modify litigants’ substantive rights as to either constitutional or statutory
matters.” In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“the rules of evidence must
yield when they offend the constitutional trial rights of litigants”) (citations omitted).
49
Reynolds disclaimed that the state secrets privilege is actually rooted in the Constitution,
stating instead that the privilege was “well established in the law of evidence” before Congress had even approved the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1, 6–7 (1953). Thus, the Reynolds Court merely interpreted and applied federal common law.
See id. at 6 n.9.
50
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958).
51
See id. at 37.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 38.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 44.
56
Id. at 43 (recognizing that the need to balance the Act’s dual objectives of protecting
national security secrets and permitting compensation via a private right of action were adequately served by ex parte in camera review of the secret information).
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As Al-Haramain argued, it is clear that Congress had preempted the
state secrets privilege when it regulated government interception of communications. First, Congress had clearly asserted its power in this area.57 As
part of FISA, Congress commanded that the procedures of FISA and Title
III be the “exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the
interception of domestic . . . communications may be conducted.”58 Congress gave these requirements teeth by authorizing private persons aggrieved by illegal electronic surveillance to bring lawsuits.59
Congress did even more by explicitly providing a procedure when
litigation implicates national security. Under section 1806(f) of FISA, in
federal cases where “aggrieved persons” seek to discover materials relating
to, or information derived from, electronic surveillance, the Attorney General may file “an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing
would harm the national security of the United States.”60 In that event, the
court “shall” conduct an in camera, ex parte review of such materials relating to the surveillance “as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance . . . was lawfully authorized and conducted.”61
Section 1806(f) thus reflected two clear Congressional judgments.
Congress dictated a protocol whenever a claim of state secrets privilege
arises in the context of litigation over electronic surveillance—a process
crafted to afford an aggrieved person the chance to make his or her case
while still protecting the Government’s legitimate claims of national security.62 The legislative history showed that Congress intended for disclosure
unless the Government asserted a national security interest. Where “no such
assertion is made [in an Attorney General’s affidavit], the Committee envisions that mandatory disclosure of the application and order, and discretio-

57
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1116 (N.D.
Ca. 2008) (“Congress intended to displace entirely the various warrantless wiretapping and
surveillance programs undertaken by the executive branch and to leave no room for the president to undertake warrantless surveillance in the domestic sphere in the future.”).
58
Id. at 1116 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2006)).
59
See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (civil cause of action for interception of communications in
violation of the Wiretap Act); 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (same for electronic surveillance in violation
of FISA); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (same for unlawful disclosures by communications
providers under the Stored Communications Act); 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(A) (same for unlawful disclosures by communications providers under the Communications Act).
60
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).
61
Id.
62
“Congress . . . anticipated that issues regarding the legality of FISA-authorized surveillance would arise in civil proceedings and . . . it empowered federal district courts to resolve
those issues, ex parte and in camera whenever the Attorney General files an appropriate
affidavit under § 1806(f).” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 470 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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nary disclosure of other surveillance materials, would be available to the
[aggrieved party].”63
Moreover, Congress determined that there could be circumstances
in which “the court may disclose to the aggrieved person” information that
the Government maintains “would harm the national security . . . under appropriate security procedures.”64 Indeed, when FISA was enacted, the legislative history expressly stated:
The conferees agree that an in camera and ex parte proceeding is appropriate for determining the lawfulness of electronic surveillance in both
criminal and civil cases. The conferees also agree that the standard for disclosure in the Senate bill adequately protects the rights of the aggrieved
person, and that the provision for security measures and protective orders
ensures adequate protection of national security interests.65

Unsurprisingly, the district court held that FISA indeed preempts
the state secret privilege in cases within FISA’s reach,66 finding that, (1)
“Congress through FISA established a comprehensive, detailed program to
regulate foreign intelligence surveillance in the domestic context;”67 (2)
Congressional intent to replace the common law privilege can be inferred
from FISA’s legislative history;68 and (3) section 1806(f) is “in effect a codification of the state secrets privilege for purposes of relevant cases under
FISA, as modified to reflect Congress’s precise directive to the federal
courts for the handling of materials and information with purported national
security implications.”69
The district court also made short shrift of the Government’s argument that the constitutional aspects of the SSP prevented Congress from
preempting the state secrets privilege, finding that “the authority to protect
national security information is neither exclusive nor absolute in the execu-

63

S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 63 (1978); accord S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. I, at 57 (1977).
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).
65
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1720, at 32
(Oct. 5, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4061; see also S. REP. NO. 95-701, at
64 (Mar. 14, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4032–33 (calling section 1806(f)
“a reasonable balance between an entirely in camera proceeding . . . and mandatory disclosure, which might occasionally result in the wholesale revelation of sensitive foreign intelligence information.”).
66
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115–24
(N.D. Ca. 2008) (using the preemption framework of Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107
n.9 (1972), under which federal common law applies “[u]ntil the field has been made the
subject of comprehensive legislation.”).
67
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
68
See id. at 1120.
69
Id. at 1119.
64
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tive branch,” and that “[w]hen Congress acts to contravene the president’s
authority, federal courts must give effect to what Congress has required.”70
V. THE STRUGGLE AFTER PREEMPTION
As the district court noted, however, “[t]he determination that FISA
preempts the state secrets privilege does not necessarily clear the way for
plaintiffs.”71 The first problem was that only an “aggrieved person” may
claim damages under FISA72 or invoke the discovery provision.73 Defendants argued that the court could not decide whether the plaintiffs were “aggrieved persons” given the Government’s successful state secrets privilege
assertion as to the Sealed Document,74 and that even “assuming arguendo
that FISA ‘preempts’ the state secrets privilege . . . plaintiffs would still be
unable to establish their standing . . . without ‘inherently risk[ing] or requir[ing] the disclosure of state secrets to the plaintiffs and the public at
large.’”75
The district court agreed that the plaintiffs could not use the Sealed
Document to establish “aggrieved person” status but permitted the plaintiffs
to amend their complaint:
Plaintiffs must first establish “aggrieved person” status without the use of
the Sealed Document and may then bring a “motion or request” under §
1806(f) in response to which the attorney general may file an affidavit opposing disclosure. At that point, in camera review of materials responsive
to the motion or request, including the Sealed Document, might well be
appropriate. . . . [P]laintiffs must present to the court enough specifics
based on non-classified evidence to establish their “aggrieved person” status under FISA.76

In its next Al-Haramain decision (the January 5 Order), the district
court found that plaintiffs had established that they were “aggrieved per70

Id. at 1121 (noting that “unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts
traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military
and national security affairs.” (emphasis in district court opinion)), quoting Dep’t of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
71
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
72
50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2006).
73
Id. § 1806(f).
74
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
75
Id. at 1132 (alterations in district court opinion) (citation omitted). Indeed, the Government had even argued that the district court could not adjudicate plaintiffs’ standing or the
merits. See infra text accompanying note 109. The Government does not dispute the use of
section 1806(f) in cases where the Government has affirmatively acknowledged the fact of
FISA surveillance. See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. CV 05-093-EJL (MHW), 2008 WL
5123009 (D. Idaho Dec. 4, 2008).
76
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
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sons,” denying the Executive’s third motion to dismiss77 and granting plaintiffs’ motion for discovery pursuant to FISA § 1806(f).78
The January 5 Order addressed:
[T]he logistical problems and process concerns that attend considering
classified evidence and issuing rulings based thereon. Measures necessary
to limit the disclosure of classified or other secret evidence must in some
manner restrict the participation of parties who do not control the secret
evidence and of the press and the public at large. The court’s next steps
will prioritize two interests: protecting classified evidence from disclosure
and enabling plaintiffs to prosecute their action.79

The district court was clear that that its case management approach
aimed not only at carrying out Congressional will under FISA, but also at
ensuring plaintiffs’ due process rights.
Unless counsel for plaintiffs are granted access to the court’s rulings and,
possibly, to at least some of defendants’ classified filings, however, the entire remaining course of this litigation will be ex parte. This outcome
would deprive plaintiffs of due process to an extent inconsistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting FISA’s sections 1806(f) and 1810.80

Accordingly, the January 5 Order provided for plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain
top secret and sensitive compartmented information security clearances and
ordered the government to review its classified submissions in this case and
determine whether any could be declassified.81

77

In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083 (N.D.
Cal. 2009). This case notes that:
Defendants’ position boils down to this: only affirmative confirmation by the government or equally probative evidence will meet the “aggrieved person” test; the
government is not required to confirm surveillance and the information is not otherwise available without invading the SSP. In defendants’ view, therefore, plaintiffs simply cannot proceed on their claim without the government’s active cooperation—and the government has evinced no intention of cooperating here.
Id.
78
Id. at 1089.
79
Id.
80
Id. The district court later stated:
I have no intention of reviewing the sealed document [containing classified information] until we get all of these pieces in place so that we can proceed in a judicial
fashion; and by that I mean a fashion in which both parties have access to the material upon which the court makes a decision.
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (VRW), 2009 WL 1468792,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) (quoting Jan. 23, 2009 case management transcript).
81
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1089–90.
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VI. THE EXECUTIVE RESISTS
The January 5 Order marked the beginning of intense resistance by
the Government. Seemingly at the heart of the resistance was the Executive’s refusal to permit litigant access to classified information. First, the
Executive quickly filed a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit and moved
for a stay in district court pending appeal and certification of interlocutory
appeal.82
Critical here was the Government’s position that the court had no
authority to order disclosure to Al-Haramain’s counsel:
[U]nder applicable Executive Orders, even if a person is found to be “suitable” to receive access to classified information after an investigation of
their background and, thus, is granted a “security clearance,” the agency
that originates the information at issue must make a separate “need-toknow” determination that actually grants access to classified information.83

That is, the agency must determine that the person has a “demonstrated
‘need to know’ classified information in connection with the performance of
a ‘governmental function’ that is ‘lawful and authorized’ by the agency.”84
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the director of the NSA had determined:
[T]hat neither plaintiffs nor their counsel have a need for access to classified NSA information that has been (or would be) excluded under the state
secrets privilege assertion. . . . [I]t does not serve a governmental function
. . . to disclose the classified NSA information . . . simply to assist the
plaintiffs’ counsel in representing the interests of private parties who have
filed suit against the NSA and who seek to obtain disclosure of information related to NSA intelligence sources and methods.85

Indeed, the Government’s reply complained that the January 5 Order “operates to take that determination from the Government in proceedings under
Section 1806(f)” and “presents a clear-cut conflict between the Court and
the Executive Branch over whether plaintiffs may receive classified information.”86
82
See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 2009 WL 1468792, at *1 (describing procedural history).
83
Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal and for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal at 12, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, No. 07-CV-109
(VRW) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2009) (citations omitted), available at http://www.eff.org/files/
filenode/att/alharamainstaymotion11909.pdf.
84
Id. at 13.
85
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
86
Government Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending
Appeal and Certification of Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) at 11, Al-

File: Tien (#8).docx

Created on: 5/11/2010 3:39:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/11/2010 4:12:00 PM

690

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 42:675

The district court denied the motion and ordered defendants to inform the court by February 27 how they intended to comply with the January 5 Order, including provisions for litigant access.87 By this time, the Justice Department had determined that two of plaintiffs’ counsel were eligible
for access to classified information.88
The district court also issued a third order requiring the Government
to respond to questions about “the Court’s authority to decide whether
plaintiffs’ counsel have a ‘need to know’ some or all of the classified information filed with the Court in this case.”89 Undeterred, the Government
continued to insist that plaintiffs and their counsel lacked “need to know”90
and made an emergency motion to the Ninth Circuit for a stay pending appeal of the January 5 Order, which was swiftly rejected for lack of jurisdiction.91
The very day that the Ninth Circuit closed off the interlocutory appeal, the Executive began its second phase of resistance by refusing to engage with plaintiffs on the substance of the January 5 Order. The Executive

Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, No. 09-CV-01791 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bc04e35b-ac56-4d83aa27-c58e3d11556c.
87
Order at 3, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, No. 06-1791 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. Feb
13, 2009), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/alharamainorder21309.pdf.
88
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management Statement at 1, Al-Haramain Islamic Found.
v. Bush, No. 06-CV-1791 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.eff.
org/files/filenode/att/alharamaincms21809.pdf (“On February 12, 2009, the Department of
Justice Litigation Security Section advised plaintiffs’ counsel that background investigations
for plaintiffs’ counsel Jon B. Eisenberg and Steven Goldberg have been ‘favorably adjudicated’ within the meaning of Executive Order No. 12968, § 3.1(b) (1995).”); see also Government Defendants’ Response to Court Orders Concerning Compliance with the January 5
Order [Dkt. 71] and Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management Report [Dkt.
75] at 4, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, No. 07-CV-00109 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. Feb.
27, 2009) [hereinafter Government Defendants’ Response to Court Orders and Response to
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management Report], available at http://www.eff.org/files/
filenode/att/govtresponsealhara22709.pdf (“[T]wo of plaintiffs’ counsel are eligible for
access to classified information.”).
89
Order, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, No. 06-CV-01791 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. Feb.
19, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
att/orderstay21909.pdf.
90
Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 1, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, No. 09-15266 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.eff.org/files/
GovtEmergStay9thCir.pdf (“[P]laintiffs do not have the requisite ‘need to know’ the information . . . .”).
91
Order, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, No. 09-15266 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/9thcirc.pdf (“We agree
with the district court that the January 5, 2009 order is not appropriate for interlocutory appeal. The government’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. The government’s
motion for a stay is DENIED as moot.”).
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maintained that plaintiffs’ counsel could not be given access to classified
information.
In this case, the relevant official . . . has determined that counsel do not
have a need to know. This decision is committed to the discretion of the
Executive Branch, and is not subject to judicial review. Moreover, the
Court does not have independent power, either under its supervisory authority, or under authority analogous to that granted by the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”), 18 U.S.C. App. 3, to order the Government to grant counsel access to classified information when the Executive Branch has denied them such access. Therefore, the Government respectfully suggests that the Court should not take further steps at this time
that would result in plaintiffs’ counsel being granted access to the classified information at issue.92

The district court was less than pleased with the Executive’s response and
ordered the parties:
[T]o meet and confer regarding the entry of an appropriate protective order
which shall be entered herein before the court rules on the merits. . . . The
parties shall submit to the court a stipulated protective order on or before
May 8, 2009. If the parties are unable to agree on all terms, they shall
jointly submit a document containing all agreed terms together with a document setting forth the terms about which they are unable to reach agreement and the respective positions of the parties with regard to each such
term. The court will then consider the submissions and enter a protective
order under which this case may resume forward progress.93

When the Government refused to stipulate to a protective order,94
the district court ordered the Government to show cause:
[W]hy, as a sanction for failing to obey the court’s orders:
(1) defendants should not be prohibited, under FRCP 37(b)(2)(ii),
from opposing the liability component of plaintiffs’ claim under 50
USC § 181 —that is, from denying that plaintiffs are “aggrieved persons” who were subjected to electronic surveillance; and

92

Government Defendants’ Response to Court Orders and Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management Report, supra note 88, at 2 (emphasis in original).
93
Order at 2–3, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, No. 06-CV-01791 (VRW) (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 17, 2009) [hereinafter April 17, 2009 Order], available at http://www.eff.org/files/
filenode/att/alharamainprotectiveorder41709.pdf.
94
Joint Submission in Response to Court’s April 17, 2009 Order [Dkt. 84] at 32, AlHaramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, No. 06-CV-01791 (VRW) (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2009)
[hereinafter Joint Submission in Response to Court’s April 17, 2009 Order], available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/jointresponsealharamain51509.pdf.
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(2) the court should not deem liability under 50 USC § 1810 established and proceed to determine the amount of damages to be awarded
to plaintiffs.95

Eventually, the district court dodged the looming constitutional issue. It instead ordered:
Plaintiffs shall base their motion on non-classified evidence. If defendants
rely upon the Sealed Document or other classified evidence in response,
the court will enter a protective order and produce such classified evidence
to those of plaintiffs’ counsel who have obtained top secret/sensitive compartmented information clearances . . . for their review. Otherwise, the
court will consider the motion on non-classified evidence.96

The briefing occurred without classified evidence, although in one last gasp,
the Executive sought to end-run the district court and, on November 9,
lodged a classified declaration from the Director of the Office of National
Intelligence with the Ninth Circuit. This too was rejected.97 Al-Haramain is
under submission in the district court as of this writing.
VII. DISCUSSION
Ostensibly, the Government’s recalcitrance was about the district
court’s plan for plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain security clearances in order to
enable their potential access to classified information. Yet that recalcitrance
is puzzling on its face. First, the Government’s position rested mainly on
non-statutory, Executive Branch rules about classified information, completely ignoring the fact that the dispute was about access within a judicial,
litigation context.98 Its argument that the court lacks “independent power,
95
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (VRW), 2009 WL
1468792, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) (pertaining to Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v.
Bush).
96
Order at 1–2, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, No. 06-CV-01791 (VRW) (N.D.
Cal. June 5, 2009), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/briefingorder6509.pdf.
97
Order, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, No. 09-36083 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2009),
available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/alharamainnotice112309.pdf (“Appellees
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc., Wendell Belew, and Asim Ghafoor’s Motion to
Strike appellants’ lodging of an In Camera, Ex Parte declaration of the Director of National
Intelligence is GRANTED. This court does not have jurisdiction over the case as the
mandate was issued on January 16, 2008.”).
98
Similar issues were raised by a lawsuit brought by former Drug Enforcement Administration employee Richard Horn alleging that a former State Department employee and a
former CIA operative illegally bugged Horn’s home in Burma in the early 1990s. Although
the district court initially upheld the Government’s assertion of the state secret privilege over
the CIA operative’s identity and dismissed the case, the D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal
and permitted Horn to proceed. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007). On
remand, the district court learned that the CIA operative’s identity had been unclassified
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either under its supervisory authority, or under authority analogous to that
granted by the Classified Information Procedures Act . . . to order the Government to grant counsel access to classified information when the Executive Branch has denied them such access”99 is especially ironic with respect
to the Sealed Document, which not only had already been disclosed to AlHaramain and his counsel, but had entered the judicial record.100
Moreover, FISA expressly authorizes the district court to “disclose
to the aggrieved person, under appropriate security procedures and protective orders, portions of the application, order, or other materials relating to
the surveillance only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.”101 While there is an
obvious question as to when such disclosure is “necessary,” Congress clearly expected that the district court would make that determination.102 Thus, in
Al-Haramain all three branches plainly have roles to play, and the Executive had already played its national security role by determining that AlHaramain’s counsel were eligible for access to classified information at the
top secret and sensitive compartmented information security clearance level.
Second, the January 5 Order was not itself about any such disclosures, but rather aimed mainly to begin the process by which any such disclosures could be made if “necessary”—not to decide whether any disclosince 2002, after which the court found that the state secrets privilege no longer applied, and
ordered the use of CIPA-like procedures to manage the classified information in the case.
Horn v. Huddle, 636 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2009). Over the Government’s objections, the district court then found that the parties’ counsel had a “need to know” entitling
them to have access to the classified information that their clients already possessed. Horn v.
Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 n.18, 66 (D.D.C. 2009).
[I]t is the Court’s determination that the attorneys need to be involved . . . for the
case to move forward while minimizing the risk to national security. The deference
generally granted the Executive Branch in matters of classification and national security must yield when the Executive attempts to exert control over the courtroom.
Id. at 65–66 (footnote omitted). The district court noted, for instance, that the plaintiff’s
attorneys had previously been granted security clearances and were able to see classified
information, but once the clearances lapsed the Government asserted that they no longer had
“need to know.” Id. at 63 n.11. The Government eventually settled with Horn for $3 million.
Settlement Agreement at 2, Horn v. Huddle, No. 1:94-CV-1756 (RCL) (D.D.C. Nov. 3,
2009), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/11/horn-v-huddlesettlement.pdf.
99
Government Defendants’ Response to Court Orders and Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management Report, supra note 88, at 2.
100
Even ignoring the unusual circumstances surrounding the Sealed Document, the Government well knew that courts of appeal had permitted the use of CIPA-like procedures in a
civil case. In Horn v. Huddle, the court of appeals had held in 2007 that CIPA-like procedures were permissible. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154.
101
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2006).
102
See supra text accompanying note 65.
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sure would be “necessary.” The district court made clear that its initial step
would be to “review the Sealed Document ex parte and in camera” and
“then issue an order regarding whether plaintiffs may proceed—that is,
whether the Sealed Document establishes that plaintiffs were subject to
electronic surveillance not authorized by FISA.”103
Perhaps the Government’s recalcitrance was rooted in its continuing
refusal to accept the district court’s ruling that FISA indeed preempted the
state secrets privilege.104 In its May 15 submission to the district court, it
reiterated that position by stating:
The Government recognizes that this Court disagrees with its position and
has held that FISA Section 1806 preempts the state secrets privilege and
provides authority for the disclosure of classified information in this case.
But the Government respectfully maintains its position, explained at length
in previous filings, that the Court’s prior rulings are in error and should be
reviewed before any disclosures occur that would actually negate that privilege assertion.105

Even this desire for appellate review makes little sense. As already
explained, nothing in the January 5 Order or any of the later orders would
actually have disclosed anything that would negate the Government’s privilege claim. In addition, if the district court did order disclosure to plaintiffs
or their counsel, such an order is statutorily deemed “final” and subject to
appellate review.106
In any case, if the Government’s litigation tactics were aimed at
getting the Ninth Circuit to review the district court’s earlier preemption
ruling prior to any disclosure to the plaintiffs, one would have expected an
end to the tactics after the Ninth Circuit declared that it lacked jurisdiction
to review the January 5 Order.107

103

In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 (N.D.
Cal 2009).
104
Government Defendants’ Response to Court Orders and Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management Report, supra note 88, at 5.
105
Joint Submission in Response to Court’s April 17, 2009 Order, supra note 94, at 18
(footnote omitted).
106
See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(h).
[D]ecisions under this section that electronic surveillance was not lawfully authorized or conducted, and orders of the United States district court requiring review
or granting disclosure of applications, orders, or other materials relating to a surveillance shall be final orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and
the several States except a United States court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
Id. (emphasis added).
107
Indeed, the district court had assumed that this desire for appellate review was the Government’s point:
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It would seem that the Government’s ultimate position is that there
can be no judicial review in cases such as Al-Haramain, even when Congress has spoken clearly. In its second motion to dismiss in Al-Haramain,
the Government essentially argued that the courts could adjudicate neither
standing nor the merits. Seizing upon the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “the
Sealed Document is protected by the state secrets privilege, along with the
information as to whether the government surveilled Al-Haramain,”108 the
Government argued that:
[A]ny effort to establish whether the plaintiffs are an aggrieved party . . .
would inherently risk or require the disclosure of state secrets to the plaintiffs and the public at large, and thus cause the very harm to national security identified by the Court of Appeals. For example . . . the Court would
first have to ascertain whether the individual plaintiffs are “aggrieved” parties as defined by the FISA. If none of the plaintiffs are aggrieved parties,
the case could not proceed, but such a holding would reveal to plaintiffs
and the public at large information that is protected by the state secrets
privilege—namely, that certain individuals were not subject to alleged
surveillance. Conversely, if the case did proceed, it could do so only as to
an aggrieved party, which would confirm that a plaintiff was subject to
surveillance.
In addition, assuming there were an aggrieved party in this case, at some
point the Court would have to grant or deny relief. If an aggrieved plaintiff
were to lose on the merits, only that plaintiff could appeal—and that fact
would be disclosed or become apparent on the public record even if the
substance of the Court’s underlying deliberations remained secret. Likewise, if the government were to lose on the merits . . . as to a particular aggrieved plaintiff, that too would either have to be disclosed or would become apparent upon any appeal. Thus, even if every effort were made to
protect any underlying information concerning alleged surveillance, serious risks remain that basic facts concerning whether or not there had
been any surveillance in this case would be inadvertently revealed in the
process.109

The United States . . . has offered up three similar-sounding alternatives all of
which appear geared toward obtaining a stay of this court’s proceedings and review
by the court of appeals, even though its simultaneous attempts to obtain review as
of right and by means of an interlocutory appeal of the January 5 order failed in
February. As both this court and the court of appeals have determined that this
matter is properly before the court, the United States should now comply with the
court’s orders.
April 17, 2009 Order, supra note 93, at 1–2 (citations omitted).
108
Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007).
109
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss for Summary
Judgment at 23–24, Al-Harmain Islamic Found. v. Bush, No. 06-CV-01791 (VRW) (N.D.
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The breadth of the Government’s hubris is as startling as it is specious. After all, the Ninth Circuit clearly held that “Al-Haramain cannot
establish that it has standing, and its claims must be dismissed, unless FISA
preempts the state secrets privilege.”110 Conversely, if FISA does preempt
the privilege, plaintiffs can establish standing and the courts can adjudicate
whether plaintiffs were surveilled. Had the Ninth Circuit believed that such
adjudication would harm national security, it would not have remanded the
case to the district court for a determination of whether FISA preempts the
state secrets privilege and “any proceedings collateral to that determination.”111
It could hardly be otherwise. Congress provided a civil cause of action for “aggrieved persons” to challenge alleged unlawful electronic surveillance and an ex parte, in camera procedure for district court review.
Reynolds made clear that “a complete abandonment of judicial control
would lead to intolerable abuses,”112 and thus “[j]udicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”113 To accept the Government’s assertion that the merits cannot be decided would negate Congressional power by preventing any judicial determination of whether the Executive had acted illegally in an area where all
three branches share constitutional responsibility.
More generally, the Government’s attempt to use the state secrets
privilege and its positional advantage with respect to classified information
access in cases such as Al-Haramain strikes at both due process and Article
III. As we have already seen, the district courts in both Horn114 and AlHaramain were acutely concerned about the fundamental fairness of litigation without some level of access to relevant classified information. To expand the impact of the state secrets privilege “would mean abandoning the
practice of deciding cases on the basis of evidence—the unprivileged evidence and privileged-but-dispositive evidence—in favor of a system of conjecture” that “would be manifestly unfair to a plaintiff.”115
Nor can courts truly perform their core judicial function without active adversary process because “[a]n informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar,”116 and “the ordinary course of litigaCal. Mar. 14, 2008) (footnote omitted), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
att/haramain2ndmotion.pdf.
110
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 507 F.3d at 1205 (emphasis added).
111
Id. at 1206.
112
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
113
Id. at 9–10.
114
See supra note 98.
115
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 150 (2007).
116
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001).
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tion involves the expression of theories and postulates on both, or multiple,
sides of an issue.”117 One can reasonably fear for judicial integrity itself.118
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has mostly been an exercise in description. Its cautionary point is simple: the Executive’s initial control of national security information gives it tremendous litigation advantages, even when Congress
has authorized courts to receive national security information precisely in
order to enable judicial review. In such situations, ordinary pretrial and discovery practice faces significant Executive resistance over access to information that “aggrieved persons” need to challenge the legality of surveillance and courts need to adjudicate these challenges. As we have seen, the
Executive resists even when a judicial order of disclosure to litigants is subject to appeal as a final judgment and when the court attempts to implement
necessary litigation management procedures, such as security clearances
and protective orders, well in advance of any actual disclosure to litigants.119
It is difficult to imagine how courts could proceed more carefully
than the Ninth Circuit and the district courts in Al-Haramain did. Congress
clearly intended FISA and the section 1806(f) procedures to operate as a
mechanism by which courts could manage litigation over the legality of
warrantless surveillance. Thus, the first lesson here is probably for Congress: any legislative preemption or reform of the state secrets privilege
must anticipate the various procedural hurdles that a highly resistant Executive will use to delay or frustrate litigation.
Perhaps more importantly, Congress cannot itself enforce individual
rights, statutory or constitutional; it needs litigants to bring cases, and it
needs courts to hear them. Yet the Government’s position on “need to
know” essentially asserts that litigation authorized by Congress precisely in
117

Id. at 548.
The Supreme Court had criticized the scheme in Velazquez for creating “doubt whether
the truncated representation had resulted in complete analysis of the case, full advice to the
client, and proper presentation to the court,” believing “courts and the public would come to
question the adequacy and fairness” of the proceedings. Id. at 546.
119
Indeed, the resolution of the Horn litigation shows how important this issue is to the
Government: the settlement agreement expressly provides that Horn agrees “not to oppose
any motion to vacate” the district court’s orders regarding CIPA-like procedures and providing for litigant access to classified information. Settlement Agreement, supra note 98, at 4.
The United States contends that vacatur is of significant interest to the Government
because the Government otherwise would prefer to contest what it sees as an erroneous application of the law. Plaintiff understands that the opportunity to seek vacatur is a significant reason why the Government is entering into settlement.
Id.
118
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order to check unlawful government surveillance is not a “governmental
function.” Al-Haramain thus presents a vision of sweeping Executive power
that ignores Congress and the courts even when they are working together
to protect individual rights against Executive abuse.

